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Abstract
Background: In the attempt to reduce waiting times in emergency departments, various national health services
have used benchmarking and the optimisation of patient flows. The aim of this study was to examine staff attitudes
and experience of providing emergency care following the introduction of a 4 hour wait target, focusing on
clinical, organisational and spatial issues.
Methods: A qualitative research design was used and semi-structured interviews were conducted with 28 clinical,
managerial and administrative staff members working in an inner-city emergency department. A thematic analysis
method was employed and NVivo 8 qualitative data analysis software was used to code and manage the emerging
themes.
Results: The wait target came to regulate the individual and collective timescales of healthcare work. It has
compartmentalised the previous unitary network of emergency department clinicians and their workspace. It has also
speeded up clinical performance and patient throughput. It has disturbed professional hierarchies and facilitated the
development of new professional roles. A new clinical information system complemented these reconfigurations by
supporting advanced patient tracking, better awareness of time, and continuous, real-time management of emergency
department staff. The interviewees had concerns that this target-oriented way of working forces them to have a less
personal relationship with their patients.
Conclusions: The imposition of a wait-target in response to a perceived “crisis” of patients’ dissatisfaction led to the
development of a new and sophisticated way of working in the emergency department, but with deep and
unintended consequences. We show that there is a dynamic interrelation of the social and the technical in the
complex environment of the ED. While the 4 hour wait target raised the profile of the emergency department in
the hospital, the added pressure on clinicians has caused some concerns over the future of their relationships
with their patients and colleagues. To improve the sustainability of such sudden changes in policy direction, it is
important to address clinicians’ experience and satisfaction.
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Background
Prolonged patient wait times in NHS emergency depart-
ments (EDs), here defined as the number of minutes
between the time the patient arrives at the ED and the
time the patient is admitted, transferred or discharged
from the ED (length of stay), have traditionally been a
major cause of patient dissatisfaction [1-5], particularly
as the demand for emergency care is rising and acuity
is becoming increasingly complex [6]. They are also a
cause of patients leaving the ED before being seen by a
clinician [7-9], adverse events [10], restricted access to
emergency care [11] and increased mortality rates [12].
To address these chronic problems in EDs, wait targets
have been applied as a means to monitor, assess and,
therefore, improve the overall experience and quality of
care. The focus on targets has triggered controversy
about their effectiveness [13-20]. Findings from a recent
systematic review [21], suggest that the 4 hour ED wait
target in the English NHS has failed to consistently
improve clinical outcomes and cautions countries which
have embarked upon similar schemes [22,23] to learn
these lessons. Certainly, these targets can speed up the
patients’ journey through the ED [24,25], particularly as
they concentrate organisational and clinical efforts in
meeting them [26-30]. However, qualitative studies,
focusing on clinicians’ understanding of the target’s
impact suggest that although patient flow and ED
experience for staff and patients may have been improved,
this has happened at the expense of quality time for
communication and treatment [31].
This paper aims to fulfil a gap in the literature by
examining changes in clinical and organisational pro-
cesses that preceded or followed the introduction of an
ED wait target. Its main objective is to demonstrate the
role of space, time and information technology in the
optimisation of patient flows. It does this by examining
how these social and technical elements were used to
support the 4 hour wait time target in the English NHS
and what it means for clinicians to practice emergency
care in this environment.
Study context
The (arbitrary [31]) 4 hour wait target was announced
by the English Department of Health in 2000 [32,33],
and took effect in January 2005. Without any reference
to other equally important sources of ED overcrowding,
such as resources, staffing and bed availability [34,35],
the idea was that through this target, EDs would be
forced to adopt private sector styles of management
[36-38] so as to optimise their operations [39], particu-
larly in an NHS of increasing number of ED attendees
(from 13.9 m in 1988 to 21.3 m in 2011) and of fewer
hospital EDs (from 310 in 1988 to 150 in 2009). Politic-
ally, the context for this policy direction was one of the
perennial “crises” in the NHS, with extensive media
coverage [40] of patients waiting for long periods of time
on trolleys in EDs. Consequently, an intensive “reengi-
neering” [41] of emergency care began by emergency cli-
nicians and managers in individual departments [42]
who worked to identify bottlenecks, map patient flows
(particularly “high volume – low variety” groups of
patients) and introduce “fast tracking” care [43,44].
This led to the development of 4 main patient streams
(“minor”, “major”, medical and surgical admissions) as
a system for reducing waiting [45,46].
This policy-led reconfiguration of time management in
ED had to be linked to space and the role of the built
environment in supporting patient streaming [47]. To
address an evident “lack of fit between layout, activities
and staff numbers” [48], two studies, commissioned by
NHS Estates [49,50], provided more specific recommen-
dations about efficient ED design layouts. Spatial recon-
figurations were undertaken which concentrated on
bringing together (or separating) both movement and
people, based on whether interactions needed to be
minimised or maximised [51,52]. Around the same time,
the most ambitious healthcare IT project in the world,
the National Programme for Information Technology
(NPfIT), began to procure clinical information systems
across the NHS [53]. Such systems were intended to
ensure collection of accurate data for benchmarking and
outcomes improvement [54-56].
Methods
Ethical considerations
Our research was approved by the Nottingham NHS
Research Ethics Committee (ref. 07/H0408/160). We
obtained informed consent from the participants and
guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality.
Design, sampling and data collection
Empirically our findings come from a wider study con-
ducted in the ED at one of the largest hospitals in the
UK (146,000 ED attendances per year). In that study, we
were interested in identifying factors that contributed to
the implementation of an Emergency Department Infor-
mation System (EDIS). However, it soon became appar-
ent that the 4 hour waiting time target, as well as the
spatial redesign of the department (completed around
1.5 years before the official introduction of the target)
had created an impetus for acquiring this information
system, as a way for the ED to meet their targets and
regain control of their expanded physical space.
Following a purposive sampling technique, we con-
ducted our semi-structured interviews over a total period
of 8 months (April - November 2008). All the participants
were using the system at the time of the interviews and
they were working in the department for at least a year
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before all these changes were completed. Particular
questions during interviews focused on (1) how the staff
understood their roles in the context of target-oriented
emergency care, (2) on identifying the ways it had trans-
formed their practice and (3) their relationships with
patients and other colleagues. While observation was not
the main data collection method, the project entailed
spending a great deal of time in the ED, and a note was
made of any interesting and salient data observed.
Data analysis
Each interview was digitally audio-recorded and all
digital audio files were then transcribed, organised and
analysed with the use of QSR NVivo 8 software for
qualitative data analysis. After the completion of the data
coding, the transcripts were reread, contrasted to de-
veloped thematic categories and cross-referenced for
relevance, consistency and relationships. A final test
included a discussion of our findings with the depart-
ment’s nursing team leader. Both design blueprints
(before and after the refurbishment) are discussed to
highlight changes necessary for an optimised inter-
action of time, space, information technology and
people under this new model of emergency care.
Results
The 28 participants in this study (23 female and 5 male)
included the system administrator, the change manager,
2 Emergency Department Assistants (EDAs), the oper-
ational services coordinator, 4 Emergency Nurse Practi-
tioners (ENPs), 4 charge nurses (NICs) and 15 staff
nurses. We analyse the way the introduction of the wait
target reconfigured this ED, namely the spatial layout,
the flow of patients through the department, the imple-
mentation of a new information technology and the flow
of power through the clinical and professional relation-
ships of its staff. By highlighting the “high interrelation”
[57] of these social and technical aspects, we show how
this new arrangement is stabilised, how it redefines and
shapes emergency care as well as the unintended conse-
quences of the new time constraint.
Redesigned Spaces: compartmentalisation
The interviewees began by discussing how the physical
space of this ED was redesigned. This was because they
had been treating an increasing number of ED attendees.
There were also issues of security, privacy and dignity
for their patients, particularly inside the treatment
rooms. They came to the conclusion that the ED build-
ing plan and patterns of space usage were good enough
for the old service model of treating patients in priority
order but not the new “See and Treat” model of patient
streaming. They also had to double the number of
rooms and, therefore, their capacity to treat patients in
dedicated spaces with dedicated staff. However, every-
thing had to be done within the existing physical
boundaries of the department. In order to optimise the
safe and prompt flow of patients, the department had
to be “compartmentalised”, meaning that the previous
unitary network of ED clinicians had to be broken
down into a number of smaller networks of clinical
teams and dedicated spaces. Moreover, the new layout
had to facilitate better surveillance of all areas and easy
way-finding for ED patients and visitors. By fine-tuning
all these processes though integration or segregation,
the department was thought to be better equipped to
meet performance standards, while creating a satisfac-
tory experience for patients and staff.
A closer examination of the design blueprints before
and after the change demonstrates this separation of the
different areas of the department and how it has since
minimised the movement of staff between them. In
Figure 1, we see that, previously, clinical areas, espe-
cially the central area (for assessing and treating minor
and major injuries/illnesses) and the resuscitation
room, constituted the main hub where all the activity
was taking place. The reception desk and the waiting
areas were peripheral to this hub, with the Children’s
section at the back of the department. For patients, the
reception desk was not directly visible and there was a
long public corridor which led them to the two main
waiting areas. Another public corridor separated re-
ception from the main area of clinical activity. With
these long corridors, natural way-finding was quite
difficult for walking patients and visitors. In addition,
staff had to walk through public spaces to access other
administrative and clinical areas. The U-shape design
inside the central area created many problems for
movement as well as for maintaining an adequate level
of privacy and security for more remote rooms.
In contrast, the new layout (Figure 2) necessitated that
all clinical areas were placed around the waiting area for
patients. Public spaces were integrated and distances
minimised so patients walked a straight line to get to
treatment areas. Common corridors between the main
and ambulance entrances to the resuscitation room were
replaced by a more direct and private one. There was also
a smaller, private corridor adjacent to Areas 1 (“minors”)
and 3 (“majors”) for cases where the ambulance crew
needs to transfer a patient directly. EDAs could overlook
the entrance and waiting area from the reception desk, as
well as control access for patients who enter the two main
treatment areas. This arrangement brought the clerical
and nursing staff closer together with an internal, private
door. Now, all the paperwork could easily be retrieved
without distant journeys through public spaces that led to
impromptu encounters with patients and, thus, delays in
treatment. Similarly, the resuscitation room was brought
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closer to the ambulance entrance. In this way, nurses
could interact with the ambulance crew unobstructed.
This segregation of patients and visitors in one waiting
area created more space for Areas 1 and 3. These areas
were integrated and connected with the Children’s
section via a private corridor, while the old Children’s
area was allocated to the new ENPs. The new design
layout created more space for accommodating a large
number of patients and clinicians. Importantly, it allowed
their cooperation in numerous ways with minimum turns
of direction and within minimum walking distances.
Lastly, the incorporation of a central staff station, where
all activities were organised, allowed increased surveillance
of patients. From this observatory, everyone was directly
Figure 1 Old layout of ED.
Figure 2 New layout of ED.
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visible and reachable, whether it is a patient or a mem-
ber of staff, facilitating security, safety and monitoring.
Consequently, the physical space was more capable of
integrating the processes that define an ED for a more
unobstructed and prompt patient streaming.
Reconfigured times: constraints
We previously discussed how emergency care was deemed
unsatisfactory because of the long waiting times, par-
ticularly for patients with minor injuries or illnesses
who were constantly pushed to the back of the queue.
The 4 hour wait target was intended to minimise this
failure of the system by attempting to control time
in emergency care work, often by dividing the overall
patient volume into smaller, more homogenised units.
However, no matter how well-configured these pro-
cesses were, the messiness of real-world practice would
inevitably interfere. Processes interfered with one another,
obstructed the ordered flows of patients and stretched
the department’s capability for meeting the target. For
example, a patient attending an ED with a presenting
complaint could not always be maintained in the same
stream for her entire trajectory. Clinicians had to deal
with these irregularities on the spot. Therefore, patients
were only allocated to streams temporarily. They acted
as a first attempt to briefly (and quite vaguely) deter-
mine the expected resources and people that would be
needed for a particular condition. This was a new man-
agerial task and an opportunity for workarounds to best
serve patients’ needs.
“I am going to be putting them in the ‘majors’ area
and they need to be seen quite quickly, but because
they are in ‘minors’ still, or do they automatically
become a ‘majors’ because they've got a nasty injury?
Or are they still a ‘minors’ because it's an injury? The
other one would be with injuries again, you've got your
category 6 which is your doctors’ minors and you've got
your category 7 which is your ENP and then your
category 4 which is your ENP priority, but you've not
got a category for doctors’ priority ‘minors’ , so they
would just go as a 6, if they need to see a doctor and
they were an injury, but then how do you put down”;
(Clinician 7).
However, the busier it got in the ED, the greater the
need to speed up clinical performance. The target, more
than actual illness and its urgency, gradually became a
critical measure of accountability and, crucially, the
target had the authority to instigate specific actions.
“Obviously, if there is a patient that needs to stay in
the Department because they are unstable or because
of their clinical condition, there's a lot of pressure put
upon the nurses in charge or the coordinators…that
they move them” (Clinician 1).
There were many legitimate reasons why critical (to the
target) delays may unfold in the ED, such as waiting for
test results or for a specialist to come and see a patient.
The ED inevitably required the timely cooperation of
many different clinical units and professionals from
elsewhere in the hospital. In certain cases, however, pro-
cesses could be speeded up and those who act on the
target’s behalf also got to be its authoritative representa-
tives for ensuring that escalation is completed by all
relevant staff members, both within and outside the
department. For example, the NIC communicated with
the Duty Nurse Manager or with the Bed Manager to
move patients, who were close to breaching the target,
to the admitting ward or the operating room.
Bridged spaces and times: information technology
Monitoring and executing emergency care, especially
under time constraints, required a new kind of inter-
mediary between space, time and people. The introduc-
tion of EDIS came to the rescue of the department
which had struggled to figure out how to manage the
increasing complexity of their work. It was a technology
that can create and maintain, for example, 4 hour wait
reports or billing records for tariff-based procedures. It
also offered a new, consistent and less confusing way of
managing the information derived from keeping track of
people, procedures, times and places.
EDIS complemented the restructuring of the depart-
ment by supporting the new organisational arrange-
ments. In fact, the department had always been keen
to have a new system in place because they knew that
“by expanding it physically it was going to become more
difficult to manage it practically”. A much bigger working
area, with many more rooms for the increasing number
of ED attendees, became easier to handle. This was
because EDIS had minimised the “guess work” of locat-
ing patients amongst different areas of the department,
since clinicians could now check the system’s map to
see where every patient was.
Undoubtedly, the system could not be held responsible
for meeting the target. This was down to the ED clini-
cians and how quickly they saw and treated patients.
What it did, though, was to increase awareness of time
and space for patients and processes by displaying
highlighted information on its tracking screen. Patients
could now pass through the department in a much
more efficient way than previously, “unless there was
somebody specifically on the shift to keep a track of
times” using paper or the metal magnetic strips on the
confined space of a whiteboard. It comes as no surprise
that the 4 hour target column (Figure 3), in the table of
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current attendees, was not only coloured red, amber or
green, depending on which patient was about to breach
the target, but it was also at the centre of the computer
screen, distinctively separating patient and condition-
related information (age, sex, triage category and inves-
tigations status) from other administrative-related ones
(location, assigned clinicians, bed requests).
Therefore, neither EDIS nor clinicians actually ensured
the meeting of the target. It was achieved by their col-
laboration, and how quickly this arrangement of people
and technologies adjusted its speed of interactions to the
pressure of the volume and acuity of patients. As long as
users inputted the necessary data, the system monitored,
computed and highlighted the required information.
Importantly, the development of this collaboration of
people and technology supported the continuous self-
management of ED activity. For example, coordinators
could check what is happening in other areas and re-
spond quickly to new requirements. Having a “better
picture” of what was going on in each subsection and in
the department as a whole, coordinators were capable of
managing staff in real-time and were able to “redeploy
people from different areas to where the biggest workload
is”. This was true, especially after the introduction of the
target. EDIS has made the process of managing for the
targets possible, “without it, it would have been a night-
mare”. Although there were, initially, some concerns
over issues of surveillance of their practice, they now
considered the system to be a useful tool for identifying
potential bottlenecks that could compromise timely
patient care.
“In the early days, it just seems like a big brother tool,
they’re monitoring us, … making sure that we’re doing,
but then when it actually comes around, and you
become one of the people that are managing things, it
does enable you, it’s not watching in a bad way. It's a
case of it enables you to see it overall what's going on,
for tracking patients and seeing where problems lie”
(Charge Nurse 5).
New organisational, data-driven, processes, like the
weekly “4 h wait meeting”, have since been put in place
to discuss reasons for target breaches, suggest ways to
improve the situation and “alleviate the pressure”.
After accepting their designated managerial role, clini-
cians were now locked into it. Gradually, they started
internalising the values and outcomes of accountabil-
ity, characterised by the production of more accurate
information.
Shifting tasks
We previously described how the target had developed
into an impetus for change in EDs by restructuring and
reordering the organisation, based not necessarily on
professional groups, but on the departments these
clinicians belong to. All staff members had now been
enrolled and mobilised to pass pressure on, both inside
and outside the department according to “a very strict
plan of action for patients who are nearing or will
breach” the target. It is this escalation of accountabil-
ity, by skilful coordinators, that became the motivating
force for action. Putting aside long-standing profes-
sional hierarchies, nurse coordinators, for example,
could now “ring and harass”, “shout down” or “badger”
(speciality) doctors until they fulfilled their role in this
process for the next operational step to take place.
Otherwise, their unavailability would be put down as
the reason for the target breach.
“ [The target] gives you a bit of ammunition really
because at first, everyone just thought, oh, it’s an ED
target, we don't need to worry about it. When actually
it's a hospital target and they do need to worry about
it and once they realise this, they’re actually getting
more helpful” (Clinician 4).
Inevitably, the work of each professional group has
changed as the system in which they work changed.
Consequently, any conflicts over the development of
new healthcare roles moved from the ‘ideological’ , to
consideration of measurable outcomes, which now pro-
vided the basis for decisions. In EDs, the new profes-
sional role of the ENP, a specialised nurse for the
purpose of taking up mundane tasks and releasing time
for doctors, was developed to strengthen the focus on
Figure 3 Part of EDIS’ main clinical screen.
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the target. These nurses were trained to act autono-
mously, based on protocols, in health promotion, educa-
tion, assessment, diagnosis and interpretation of X-Rays,
while they can treat and prescribe medications for minor
illnesses and injuries [58,59]. They are now considered
an effective solution for reducing wait times, particularly
in overcrowded urban EDs with high volumes of low
acuity patients and physician shortages [60]. Most of the
interviewees in our study thought ENPs made an invalu-
able contribution to the reduction of target breaches.
We have already seen how the focus on the target as a
means of addressing the chronic problem of ED wait
times led to the replacement of one big queue, in which
every patient was prioritised, with a smaller, more man-
ageable, and less visible queue. In conjunction with the
new system, an added benefit of this change was that
these patients could have more information regarding
their position in this queue which “does help them”. For
example, patients waiting could be informed about how
many people were in front of them. EDAs at the recep-
tion, while they could not know precisely how long a
patient would have to wait, could look up the queue in
EDIS and reassure these patients that they were “still on
the system, everything is in time order” and that they
would not “get missed”. On the other hand, this was only
for those patients who are accepted into these queues.
Just like the clinicians who managed their trajectories,
patients were subjects of the same target. The target
acted as the objective justification for exclusions. Patients,
whose medical condition did not meet the profile of the
ED attendee, were referred to other services (e.g. GPs,
minor injury units and walk-in centres).
“Before, we couldn't have sent anybody away, we
didn't have that sort of authority to send people away,
so it was like well…you're not important to be seen, so
everyone needs to be seen before you, so if you're
waiting here 6 hours that's how long you will wait”
(Clinician 5).
For those patients who had successfully managed to
navigate themselves through the maze of the healthcare
system and had been given a ‘boarding pass’ to the ED,
a better clinical experience and quality of care was
“pledged” [61]. This was evident from the fact that
almost all of our participants stated that they would not
want to go back to the previous clinical reality of EDs
with “doctors sitting on the floor doing assessments” and
patients “who had been waiting two days to get to a
ward”. On the other hand, this more modern, target-
oriented, healthcare inevitably happened at the expense
of some of the clinicians’ more traditional values around
their personal relationships with the patients and their
colleagues. They were forced to redefine and restructure
their system of values to be more managerial. More speed,
more compartmentalisation and more technologically-
mediated communication sometimes made them “feel
under pressure to quicken up”, which in turn made it “very
hard not to sacrifice patient care”.
“People don’t speak to each other about patients much
anymore. [EDIS] takes you away from the patient. We
used to…go in with the doctor to find out what was
going on with the patient and then the doctor would
relay it to you, so you’d learn from the doctor… now
it’s all just on screen and people don’t talk about
patients…it’s all just conveyor belt, it feels more
conveyor belt and that’s obviously what they wanted
with the efficiency and the four hours and every nurse
will tell you that”. (ENP 5)
Discussion
We did a qualitative study with the aim of understand-
ing the transformation of clinical practice and local con-
sequences from the introduction of a national target for
waiting at an ED. We found the 4 hour wait target
supported the development of a new type of spatial
and temporal regulation of ED staff ’s work. This was
achieved by first redesigning the built environment into
separate areas, according to acuity categories, so as
to facilitate efficient patient throughput. ED staff per-
ceived this compartmentalisation as an improvement
for security, privacy and way-finding for patients, and it
reduced unnecessary movements. Moreover, they con-
sidered the target a catalyst for building collaboration
with the rest of the hospital and for speeding up clinical
performance. Irrespective of professional hierarchies,
they were more likely to be heard when they requested
a specialist opinion and inter-departmental efforts were
made to secure beds for admissions promptly. The
target has also increased the value of the ENP’s role by
autonomously treating patients with minor illnesses/
injuries. It also necessitated the implementation of a
new clinical information system. ED staff found the
system’s capabilities for advanced tracking, awareness
of potential target breaches, and continuous, real-time
management of staff particularly useful. These features
were also helpful in reassuring the patients that they
would be treated in time. The convenience of accessing
structured information and of producing reports led to
the development of new self-regulating processes, such as
the 4 hour wait target weekly meeting. However, some
nurses felt that the added pressure to move patients
quickly has affected their relationships with patients
and colleagues.
We have been able to make explicit the social and
technical aspects of emergency care and highlight the
complexity of their interrelations. Thus, we were able to
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tell a more complete story of the process by which the
new policy of the 4 hour wait target and an emergency
department adapted to each other at the local organi-
sational and professional context [62,63]. We paid par-
ticular attention to unintended consequences as they
revealed the strength of mutual dependencies between
the social and technical elements that hold this new way
of working together [64] and, provided an opportunity
to investigate their role in shaping the outcomes of this
organisational change [65]. In this case, it helped us to
understand how space, time and information technology
can be manipulated and mobilised. From there, we
described a process by which they shape and are shaped,
locally, as the new arrangements struggle to reach a
consensus around the wait target and the ED consoli-
dates itself as a ‘modern’ emergency department.
Reducing maximum waiting times in ED has been the
focus for this policy, as they are known to be important
to patients, and are easily measurable, understandable
(unlike, for instance, quality and safety) and easier to
achieve (unlike average waiting times) [66]. On the other
hand, the ED has traditionally been a resource-poor and
comparatively neglected area of the hospital, despite its
high public profile. This is partly due to the low status
of ED work within the wider medical profession [67],
and a perception that, despite the major emergencies,
much of the ED’s work consists of minor injuries and ill-
nesses. The target meant that the ED, often for the first
time, became the focus of managerial attention and
resources [68]. The system of performance management
in the NHS meant that hospital Chief Executives and
Boards were directly accountable for the performance of
the ED against the target, and therefore took a much
closer interest in the ED than had been the case hitherto.
There was a concomitant expansion in the resources
available to EDs. For instance, though the redesign had
happened prior to the introduction of the 4 hour wait
target in 2005, its announcement in 2000 and the subse-
quent work of emergency departments on fast track
care made the reconfiguration of space a necessity.
Likewise, the introduction of the IS system, and the
streaming processes were all originally introduced in
order to meet the target, but collectively led to a revolu-
tion in working in the ED.
In particular, the redesign of the built environment,
towards compartmentalisation, signifies an important
paradigm shift on the way healthcare organisations under-
stand the practical value of space in the mediation of
work. They acknowledged, perhaps for the first time, that
spaces are not just neutral containers of social action.
Therefore, if the aim is to implement a certain model
of healthcare delivery, the configuration of the physical
environment becomes a precondition, as “function
follows form”. Likewise, time is not fixed and absolute.
It too exerts meaning and it is embedded in local
contexts and processes, structuring actions, events and
behaviours. But when it comes to organisational prod-
uctivity, the quantifiable clock time is mostly viewed as
a simple, independent, self-explanatory variable and a
resource that can be manipulated accordingly so as to
increase efficiency of work.
Here, the introduction of the 4 hour wait target
brought a new reckoning and re-embedding of time in
the ED. Under this new “temporal rhythm”, patients
arrived with a well-defined “temporal trajectory” of their
condition while staff had a very “close and inflexible
time horizon” to complete activities [69]. Any delay
could cause the ED to (unjustifiably) exceed the 2%
exceptions margin on target breaches. As ownership of
the target moved across the hospital [14] more measures
were taken to improve flows and minimise bottlenecks.
Since the target was introduced, there has been, for
instance, substantial growth in the number of emergency
medicine consultants, development of new clinical speci-
alities for treating minor injuries (ENP) [24,43] as well
as increased leadership, particularly for nurses, who now
have an enhanced role in care coordination. In effect,
the target brought about a change in the ED’s relation-
ship with the rest of the hospital. There was a major
shift in the balance of power [70] between the ED and
other hospital departments. We offer striking evidence
of ED staff arguing up the hospital hierarchy and push-
ing for specific actions to take place so as to speed up
care [71] and prevent a target breach. Pressure on nurses
to meet targets was passed onto those they consider
(partly) responsible for the breaches (doctors in inpatient
specialities) [14].
Moreover, our findings demonstrate how the new
technology of EDIS came to support an increasing need
for the ED to accumulate and remotely display more
information so as to track patients and coordinate activ-
ities [72]. Through a more efficient “horizontal” and
“vertical” surveillance [73], it has become an essential
aspect of the new model of target-oriented clinical team-
work. Importantly, it has also contributed to the recon-
figuration of inter-professional power relationships. By
taking up the sequencing activities, EDIS acted as a
reliable and independent ‘observer’ who provided the
shared temporal order necessary for work synchronisa-
tion. In effect, it equalised power relationships with
fewer work-related conflicts between these two groups
[74]. This is because the meanings and purposes of
organisational activities, and boundaries are redrawn as
everyone gets synchronised to the technology’s temporal
rhythm [75].
While the new resources and shift in the balance of
power in ED’s favour were viewed positively by the ED
staff, other unintended consequences of the target were
Vezyridis and Timmons BMC Emergency Medicine 2014, 14:12 Page 8 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-227X/14/12
more unwelcome. We did not find evidence pointing to
any change of the type or quality of care [21], but clini-
cians were concerned about how the target had affected
their ways of working. They felt like they had less time
with their patients, and were under more pressure to
keep moving them through the department [27,31,76].
Here, our qualitative findings complement those of other
studies [77-80], which have statistically confirmed an
increase in clinical activity around 20 minutes before the
4 hour cut-off since the introduction of the target.
Undoubtedly, clinicians do not wish to go back to the
era when patients waited for many hours before they
were treated [31]. However, they viewed their work
as becoming more like working on a production line
(indeed, that metaphor appears in several of the inter-
views), as they gradually adopted a “distal” healthcare
paradigm of technically managing the business side of
their practices [81]. This could be a manifestation of
“proletarianization” [82]. This is the ‘modern’ process
by which organisations seek to transform the work of
professionals, who typically have a high degree of inde-
pendence and discretion, into work where they are much
more closely monitored and supervised, aligning their
work practices much more closely with the organisa-
tion’s requirements.
In this case, the modernisation of EDs began by trans-
lating patient dissatisfaction with wait times into an
“internal” performance indicator [83]. It signified the
“pressure of time” [39] as a decisive characteristic of
healthcare efficiency and a hard to refute “political sym-
bolism” [83]. Consequently, this new “professional ethos
of self-governance” [84] required the internalisation of
the values of responsibility and accountability [85]. The
more ED clinicians internalised them, the more their
capacity for self-governance and learning increased.
However, to achieve this, the ED has been arranged and
steered towards the production of more information as a
way of meaningfully interpreting the target and optimis-
ing its processes so as to improve emergency care. These
include better bed management systems, protocols and
guidelines for speeding up treatments, the extension of
nursing responsibilities for undertaking more biomed-
ical, managerial and administrative activities, the applica-
tion of time limits for specialty doctors to attend ED
from other parts of the hospital [86], the technological
mediation of communication [87], and workload man-
agement systems [88]. Such efforts at standardising care,
which involve processes, information systems and the
physical space, have intensified lately as more EDs embark
on Lean process improvement methods. While these
initiatives may hold a great potential for addressing
lengths of stay and patient satisfaction, the added,
“indirect” [89] burden they placed on clinicians in terms
of workload, autonomy and anxiety is often neglected.
Thus, while the new way of working was successfully
and sustainably stabilised (and continues to the time of
writing), this stabilisation was not without wider social
consequences for the ED and the staff within it. Indi-
vidual clinicians continue to experience a stark conflict
between the two ethos (traditional clinical and new profes-
sional) in the process of improving the quality of care.
Limitations
The study was limited to one emergency department.
Generalisations should thus be made with caution. The
sample was of appropriate size given the nature of the
topic and, in particular, difficulty in recruiting partici-
pants due to high levels of workload and staff turnover.
The decision to recruit mainly nurses was based on the
fact that this professional group represented the biggest
user group of this system, which is also responsible for
the coordination of activities in this clinical setting
to meet the wait target. Also, our attempts to recruit
medical staff that met our selection criteria were unsuc-
cessful. We acknowledge that this may be a significant
weakness of our sampling methodology.
Conclusions
Policy changes can have deep and unintended conse-
quences for health care organisations. We have shown
that the imposition of a wait-time target led to the devel-
opment of a new, and very sophisticated, way of working
in the ED studied. This consisted of a complex arrange-
ment of people, process, technology and space, none of
which was intended by those who originally framed the
4 hour wait target. There is wide agreement among clini-
cians that this target raised the profile of the ED in the
hospital and concentrated efforts to address patients’
dissatisfaction with waiting times. It forced them to self-
examine their practices, and rethink about the way they
use space and manage information and patient flows. At
the same time, it has put added pressure on them which
causes concern over the effect it might have on their
interpersonal relationships with their patients and
colleagues. Linking patient satisfaction with clinician
satisfaction may be the way forward.
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